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Nentjes A , Boom JT , Dijkstra BT , Koster M , Woerdman E , Zhang ZX

400 p in Dutch   2002

Toon Nederlands

English Abstract
International emissions trading between private parties established in Annex B countries requires international linkage of national schemes of emissions trading. The report presents a design for national emission trading schemes and rules for linking them to form an international scheme. A national and international cap and trade scheme as well as a credit trading scheme based on performance standards have been worked out. Next to design issues the market performance and political acceptation of types of national and international emission trading are discussed. A major conclusion trading is that cap and trade is the most effective and efficient national and international option, but credit trade is politically more feasible. The conditions for adequate functioning of tradeable permit schemes as well as potential market failures (high transaction cost, abuse of market power and non cost minimizing behaviour) have been assessed. As a potential type of international market failure the abuse of emission trading schemes as instrument of trade policy has been identified. The question whether differences in national permit schemes could distort international competition on product markets is also discussed. Next to that the arguments for and against and the restriction on flexibility proposed by the EU until July 2001 are analysed and the impact of such a restriction on market performance. Key words: emission trading, flexibility instruments and climate change policy instruments.


RIVM - Bilthoven - the Netherlands - www.rivm.nl

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RIVM - Bilthoven - Nederland - www.rivm.nl

( 2002-03-01 )